What would and adequate philosophy of social science look like?

"To the prima facie face that human actions are intentional event in the sense that ther identity is a function of ther content - what they express or the states of affaires they refer to - and, consequently, that they are characterized by invoking the rules and intentions which define them to be what they are, there are three possible responses: The first of these is to accept this prima facie fact and to try to construct a science of intentional objects in terms of it: this is the intentionalist response. The second is to attempt an analysis of the concepts ïntentions", "meaning", and "action" in purely observational (usually behavioral) terms, so that one can use these concepts in one's science but in a purified form: this is the thack of the definitional behaviorist. The third response is to accept that one cannot capture the meaning of intentional concepts without reference to mental states such as beliefs and institutional norms, such as rules, and so conclude that these concepts are radically defective for scientific purposes; it therefore seeks to develop a science of behavior without using these concepts at all. This is the position of the eliminative materialists who ultimately wish to confine their accounts of language and other social behavior to a purely extensional terminology."

Brian Fay and J. Donald Moon

No les parece una sintesis genial?